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DUNWODY DISTINGUISHED LECTURE IN LAW

THE OBLIGATION TO REASON WHY
RUTH BADER GINSBURG*

At the September 1984 dedication of your new building, Justice Rehnquist
spoke of generalist judges and specialist legal educators as people "hoeing ...
ground in the same vineyard."' Justice Stevens, around the same time, remarked that in the United States, lawyers, law teachers, and judges share
membership in "a dynamic, integrated profession": 2 "the law schools and the
law courts," he said, "are constantly learning from one another, just as practicing lawyers are constantly teaching and learning from both professors and
judges.' ' In the spirit of learning from each other, I will comment this morning
on some aspects of the business that has occupied me since the summer of
4
1980 - the business of reaching and composing appellate decisions.
Law students are immersed in the analysis of appellate opinions. Indeed,
the traditional curriculum is legitimately criticized for overemphasizing judgments on appeal as a source of law.5 My remarks, however, will not be of the
analytical genre routinely encountered in the law school classroom. There, I
recall, teachers and students expose appellate opinions to the surgeon-lamp glare
of what Judge Friendly has titled the "presumptively erroneous" rule. 6 The
views on appellate decisionmaking I will present have been formed inside the

*

U.S. Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
1. Address by Justice Rehnquist, Dedication of the Bruton-Geer Building, University of
Florida Law School (Sept. 5, 1984), reprinted in 1984-85 UNIV. OF FLA. LAW. 8 (Winter) (hereinafter
cited as Rehnquist Speech].
2. Address by Justice Stevens, Dedication of the Arthur Rubloff Building, Northwestern
University School of Law 7 (Aug. 4, 1984).
3. Id. at 6.
4. For thoughtful comment on the federal appellate decisionmaking process, see generally
F. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE (1980); Edwards, Vie Role of a Judge in Modern Societ: Some
Reflections on Current Practice in Federal Appellate Adjudication, 32 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 385 (1983-84);

Friendly, Reactions of a Lawyer - Newly Become Judge, 71 YALE L.J. 218 (1961-62). For an enlightening empirical study and analysis of the roles and work ways of federal circuit judges, see J.
HOWARD,

COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM (1981). An impressive work on

the federal judicial system, concentrating on the overloaded courts of appeals, appeared after this
address was composed. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985).

5.
(1983).

See Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570, 581-84

6. H. FRIENDLY, SOME EQUAL PROTECTION PROBLEMS OF THE 1970's 5 (N.Y.U. Law School,
ed. 1970).
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courthouse. Staying on familiar ground, I will concentrate on the federal court
system's middle tier, the United States Courts of Appeals, 7 and draw particularly
on my experience as a judge of the District of Columbia Circuit.
I.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR "GETTING

IT

RIGHT"

As a preface, I will state two core values by which court performance may
be measured,' and compare the business of trial and appellate courts in the
United States in relation to those values. First, courts strive to "get it right"
to reach a correct result in the case at hand. 9 Second, judges seek both to
be fair and to appear fair to the parties. For the fact finder, fairness is the
prime objective. "Getting it right" looms larger when a court defines and
applies the law, particularly in a system wedded to the concept that the judiciary
both sets and follows precedent. '
In the common law tradition, facts are determined first, and generally last
as well, by the court of first instance, the trial court." Appellate judges follow
the rule that the trial court's adjudication of the facts may be disturbed only
if the record shows that findings made in the first instance are "clearly erroneous.'12 We defer well nigh totally to trial court judgments on matters of

7. The present middle tier of the federal court system has been in place since 1891. Act
of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1982)). The 13 courts
of appeals review final decisions of the district courts, now 90 in number, and directly review
certain agency actions.
8. Judge Charles Breitel, former Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, was once
asked to list the values by which the performance of an appellate court could be measured. He
suggested nine items: expedition, explication, progressiveness, integrity in fact, integrity in appearance, fairness, independent judicial research, and physical and procedural accessibility. R. LEFLAR, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF APPELLATE COURTS 2 (1976); see also Easterbrook, The
Supreme Court, 1983 Term - Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 58 (1984) (on the tension between courts' "dispute-resolution and rule-creation functions").
9.

See K.

LLEWELLYN,

THE

BRAMBLE

BUSH 33 (1981)

("[Clourts of review

. . . feel

the

pressure of the individual case, and strain to decide it right.").
10. In contrast to the common law tradition, most civil law systems do not formally recognize
the doctrine of stare decisis. SeeJ. MERRYMAN & D. CLARK, COMPARATIVE LAW: WESTERN EUROPEN
AND LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMs 551-87 (1978) (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Mexico).
Even in these systems, however, the individual case is not an island. Cf. Newman, Rethinking
Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE L.J. 1643 (1985) (urging those concerned with
the law to think of fairness not simply in a narrow, individual case frame, but with reference to the
litigation system as a whole, including the impact of that system upon all who are affected by it).
11. In civil law systems, appellate tribunals may review facts as well as law de novo; witnesses
not uncommonly are reheard by the second tribunal, particularly when demeanor is significant. See
Kaplan, Civil Procedure - Reflections on the Comparison of Systems, 9 BUFFALO L. REV. 409, 413 (1960);
Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, Phases of German Civil Procedure I, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1443, 145 154 (1958); see also R. GINSBURG & A. BRUZELIUS, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN SWEDEN 324 (1965).
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). The degree of deference appellate courts give to a trial judge's
findings of fact may be compared to the deference given an agency interpretation of the agency's
own regulations. While the respect accorded to the agency is large, courts will vacate and remand
an agency's disposition if the agency does not logically explain what it is doing and why. SeeGUARD
v. United States Nuclear Regulator), Comm'n, 753 F.2d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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credibility; we demand no explanation from a jury or even a judge why Mr.
Badegg's testimony was believed while Ms. Goodkind's was disregarded. There
is considerable leeway, in short, for arriving at a conclusion on a matter of
historical fact without detailing one's route to decision. Judges, moreover, generally welcome and accept parties' fact stipulations without looking behind them
to spy out real truth. Nor, when facts are disputed, are judges wont to pursue
3
on their own initiative evidentiary leads that neither side has elected to follow.'

Ordinarily, it suffices for the judge to assure himself that the parties have had
a fair opportunity to present what they will, even if further digging would be
in order to "get it right."
On the other hand, parties cannot stipulate how the court should read a
statute that defines the tribunal's subject matter competence14 or one that regulates or affects not simply the parties' private conduct, but the behavior or
treatment of others in the community served by the court's decisions. Nor may
the parties limit the publications the court is at liberty to consult in researching
the law. A court charged with defining the law may not rely on unarticulated
intuition, and it should not rest with the parties' presentations if they are
inadequate. When declaration and superintendence of the law are at stake, the
court is obliged conscientiously to reason why.
I turn now to endeavors of courts of appeals to live up to the expectation
that they will strive hard to state and apply the law right. I will speak first of
preparation in chambers, of the parties' briefs and arguments, and of the conference at which panels of judges arrive at proposed dispositions. Next, I will
describe the ways in which we prepare and pronounce our decisions.
II.

ARRIVING AT PROPOSED DISPOSITIONS

My court, typical of federal courts in this respect, houses a "hot" bench.
That means before oral argument or court conference we individually bone up
on the array of cases our clerk's office packages for panels weeks in advance
of a sitting period.' 5 Generally, judges commence preparation for a civil case
by reading the decision attacked on appeal - the district court's judgment or
the agency's rule or adjudication.
Judges next approach the briefs; they do so with an attitude of hopeful
skepticism. Particularly if the case is complex, the judge may read, before
turning to the parties' writings, a law clerk's "bench memo" digesting key

13. In contrast, a civil law judge may take steps sua sponte to clarify factual questions. See
Kaplan, supra note 11, at 411-12; Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, Phases of Gennan Civil Procedure

1, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1224-27 (1958).
14. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 398 (1975); Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
126, 229 (1804); C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 5 3522,
at 66-72 (1984).
15. Cases are assigned to panels randomly; judges cannot choose the cases they will hear,
and lawyers cannot choose the judges who will hear their cases. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT, HANDBOOK OF PRACTICE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES 56 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as D.C. CIR. HANDBOOK].
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portions of the record and guiding the judge's way through the briefs. The
hope is for crisp briefs, offering only argument the court can reasonably be
asked to buy, developed logically in sentences and paragraphs one can grasp
on first reading. The reality, too often, is an unrefined presentation, including
much chaff that, as my colleague Judge Abner J. Mikva has stated, some
lawyers foolishly regard as "harmless surplus."'"
Able lawyers, like effective performers in other arenas, know and play to
the audience. 7 In my court, lawyers play to three busy judges who confront
some sixteen to twenty sets of briefs, four or five days nearly in a row each
month. Such an audience lacks the patience to ferret out bright ideas buried
in complex sentences, overlong paragraphs, or too many pages. Judge Patricia
M. Wald of my court has commented that eye fatigue, even irritability, sets
in well before page 50.8 A lawyer who fails to keep his expression clear and
compact risks writing solely fbr the law clerk. The judge facing undue verbiage
may not proceed beyond the summary of argument. For the rest, he may rely
on a law clerk's bench memo.
Occasionally, hope for the brief is not in vain. Now and then we do receive
briefs of prize-winning quality. Even when a brief is a finely composed product,
however, judges remain skeptical. The attitude is endemic to the job. Skepticism
stems in substantial measure from the value of "getting it right." The law we
identify and apply is not cast for one day and case alone. We cannot rely
entirely on today's parties to define law that will touch tomorrow's controversies.
We are obliged to pursue an independent inquiry.
There are limitations, of course, on our zeal to "get it right." We cannot
sacrifice fairness to the parties in the process. Judges, aided immeasurably by
law clerks, may comb reports and services a lawyer left untouched, or research
treatises and law reviews the lawyer did not consult. But lawyers know the
universe of information we might consider; they are aware of the material that
time or other cause led them to skip. Suppose, however, that instead of, or
along with, dispatching law clerks to library shelves and computer terminals,
I phone Law Professor Sage, acclaimed expert in an arcane field, and ask how
he would resolve my hard case. That is out of bounds. 9 It would be off the
record, and outside the universe of published material accessible to the litigants.
Even if I exposed the consultation to the parties and invited their comment,

16. Mikva, Counsel Lack Selectivity in Appellate Advocacy, LEGAL TIMES Nov. 15, 1982, at 10; see
also Hon. Sandra Day O'Connor: Instit'le of Judicial Administration Members' Breakfast, 1984 I.J.A. REP.,
1, 2 (Summer) ("Brevity [in briefs] not only is the soul of wit; it also often animates the most
persuasive legal argument.") [hereinafter cited as O'Connor Speech].
17. The District of Columbia Circuit's policy is to announce the identity of panels on the
Monday of the week in which the panel begins to sit. D.C. CiR. HANDBOOK, supra note 15, at
59. It is not uncommon for lawyers, once advised of the identity of the panel, to run a computer
search for panel members' decisions in the subject area involved.
18. Wald, Inside the U.S. Court of Appeals, 1983 DISTRICT LAW. 38, 42 (July-Aug.).
19. See T. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS: INFORMATION GATHERING IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 98-100 (1978) (discussing judges' reasons for refusing to consult experts).
20. The Code of Judicial Conduct states that a judge may obtain the advice of a disinterested
expert if he gives notice to the parties and affords them an opportunity to respond to the expert's
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suspicion would cling that the loser faced an unfair, virtually insurmountable

burden.
I recall in this regard Professor Paul A. Freund's remark about one of the

giants of the District of Columbia Circuit, Judge Harold Leventhal, who served
on the court from 1965 until his death in 1979. Professor Freund said: "[Firom
time to time, [Judge Leventhal] would call me on the telephone to talk about
a lecture he was to give - never, I need hardly add, did he call and speak
about a case." ' 2 While I may not ring up Professor Sage to talk about a case,
because that would tarnish the appearance of fairness, there is a certain irony

in the access I have at all times to three bright law clerks. I encourage their
comments and attempts to influence or change my mind. Conversation with
one's own staff, though off the record, is entirely within accepted bounds.
In most cases calendared in the District of Columbia Circuit, judges will
move directly from preparation in individual chambers to the courtroom session
with colleagues and counsel at which oral argument occurs. In contrast to the

enduring brief, oral argument is fleeting. We allow fifteen or twenty minutes,
sometimes only ten, and never more than thirty per side. We tape the argument,
but ordinarily do not transcribe it.

In some circuits the written briefs are all the court will receive in a high
percentage of appeals. My District of Coltmbia Circuit colleagues value the
face-to-face encounter with counse 2 2 and have thus far resisted the trend to
dispense with it. For the past three terms we have disposed of only between
five and ten percent of our decided cases without oral argument. In sharp

contrast, the Fifth Circuit dispensed with oral argument in forty-nine percent
of the cases it decided during the twelve-month period ending June 30, 1984.
In the same period, Eleventh Circuit panels 23resolved without oral argument
fifty percent of appeals presented for decision.

advice. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 3A(4)(1980). This notice-and-comment procedure, accommodated without strain at the trial level where pretrial conferences are routine, is not well
suited to collegial courts of appeals, where no judge acts alone and there is, ordinarily at most,
only one court-counsel encounter. But cf. Wald, Making "Informed" Decisions on the District of Columbia
Circuit, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 135, 153-54 (1981-82) (proposing that "the appellate dialogue
between the court and the parties continue beyond the oral argument, when needed by the judge").
The Reporter's Notes to the Code of Judicial Conduct suggest that a court may obtain the advice
of an expert by inviting the expert to file a brief amicus curiae. E. THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES
TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 11 (1973).
21. Lecture by P. Freund, "Storms Over the Supreme Court: The Inaugural Harold Leventhal Memorial Lecture," at Columbia Law School 1 (Nov. 17, 1982).
22. Attorneys value the encounter at least as much. As Justice O'Connor has observed, they
"instinctively feel reassured when they have an opportunity to address face-to-face the appellate
judges deciding the[ir] case." O'Connor Speech, supra note 16, at 1.
23. Statistics for the D.C. Circuit were furnished by the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, Statistical Analysis and Reports Division; those for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits
were obtained from those circuits, on the author's request, by D.C. Circuit Administrative Section
Supervisor Patricia L. Chatman, and appear in a memorandum dated February 25, 1985 [hereinafter
cited as Chatman Memorandum]. The statistics represent the percentages of cases briefed and
submitted to a merits panel, and thereafter "terminated by judicial action" without oral argument.
In the D.C. Circuit, oral argument occurs unless all three panel members agree to dispose of the
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Oral argument, as I see it, is in most cases a hold-the-line operation for
counsel, not as important as the brief, but a significant ground-retaining exercise. In nearly five years of appellate judging, I have witnessed only one victory
snatched at oral argument from a total defeat all three panelists, it later emerged,
had anticipated prior to argument. But I have seen several potential winners
lose because of clarification elicited at argument.
Oral argument can be lively or dull depending upon the attorneys' skill and
the composition of the bench. (Court of appeals calendars, I should explain,
are arranged so that in each of the year's several sitting periods a judge sits
with a different set of colleagues. In the D.C. Circuit, each member of the
court will sit with every other member for at least one week in the court's
annual, at least eight-cycle term. 24) Questions generally are not posed to display
the judge's wit, but to let counsel know what troubles the judge about the case
or issue on which counsel is trying to convince the court. Occasionally, a judge
tries to cue counsel that an argument he is pursuing is a loser, so that precious
time should not be wasted on it. Sometimes a question is asked with persuasion
of a colleague in mind, or to assist counsel to clarify or strengthen a position.
I will not deny that questions may be framed to elicit a concession, which later
turns up in a footnote to the opinion reading: "At argument, counsel conceded
thus and so." ' 2 1 Concessions, however, are not inevitably damaging. My colleague Judge Wald has observed that a concession once in a while can enhance
26
a lawyer's credibility.

case on the written submissions. D.C. CIR. R. 11 (d). For a survey and statistical presentation released
some months after I delivered this lecture, see J. CECIL & D. STIENSTRA, DECIDING CASES WITHOUT
ARGUMENT: A DESCRIPTION OF PROCEDURES IN THE COURTS OF APPEAL (Federal Judicial Center 1985).
Contrary to what one might expect in view of the generally increasing case filings, the percentage
of decided cases disposed of by the D.C. Circuit without oral argument appears to have declined
since the early 1970's. See United States v. Baber, 447 F.2d 1267, 1271 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam)
(reporting that "18-plus percent" of briefed appeals scheduled for determination by a merits panel
were disposed of without oral argument), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 957 (1971).
For a description of an expedited appeals program that not only preserves, but expands the role of
oral argument, see ABA ACTION COMM'N TO REDUCE COURT COSTS & DELAY, ATTACKING LITIGATION
COSTS AND DELAY 27-34 (1984) (plan inaugurated in California Court of Appeal in Sacramento).
As summarized by Justice O'Connor, the program operates this way:
In appeals placed on its expedited calendar, the Sacramento court limits the briefs of the
parties to ten pages, exclusive of the statement of facts. Simultaneous briefs are to be filed
in 20 days and no reply brief is permitted. Oral argument is scheduled within 30 days
of the filing of the briefs and the time of oral argument is not limited in advance. It can
continue as long as the court thinks it necessary. The court's goal is to file its opinion
within ten days after oral argument. Cases are selected for the expedited appeal program
by a single judge of the court and with consent of the parties. The cases selected tend to
be those which are relatively straightforward although not necessarily simple or easy cases.
O'Connor Speech, supra note 16, at 1-2.
24. See D.C. CIR. HANDBOOK, supra note 15, at 54.
25. See, e.g., Briley v. Booker, 746 F.2d 225, 227 (4th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Garner v.
Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 391 n.5 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Multi-Management, Inc., 743
F.2d 1359, 1365 (9th Cir. 1984); see also GUARD v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
753 F.2d 1144, 1146 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (scope of case clarified at oral argument).
26. Wald, supra note 18, at 42.
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I have learned to listen at argument as much to my colleagues as to the
advocates. Colleagues' questions may alert me to concerns of other judges that
I should address at conference or ultimately in an opinion.
District of Columbia Circuit judges all have their chambers in the same
building. Even so, except in cases of enormous bulk27 or extraordinary sensitivity, panel members generally do not meet, or even phone each other, to
discuss a case before the scheduled argument. We do confer to reach tentative

decisions directly after a morning's arguments, 'Often without pausing for lunch.
The immediacy of the conference indicates the importance of advance preparation. At our conferences an air of informality prevails. Our custom is to hear
first from a judge on senior status or a visiting judge, if we have one on the
panel, then from active circuit judges in reverse order of seniority. We take
up the day's cases one by one. Each judge reports how he is inclined to rule
and why.
Most conferences are brief. I had anticipated more in the way of exchange
with colleagues in relation to decisions than in fact occurs. 2 There are exceptions. Five of my court's currently ten active judges, and one of the senior
judges, were once full-time law teachers. A panel including two or three former
law teachers can be as spirited in conference as it is at argument.
If we had less business, I might favor pre-argument meetings, at least in
the more complex cases. 29 As it is, even the most diligent judge sometimes does
not get through the piled briefs of parties, intervenors, and amici, and requested
law clerk bench memos, ahead of the last pre-argument hour.

27. See, e.g., Arthurs, Shifting Positions Complicate Appeals of Charge Order, LEGAL TIMES April 16,
1984, at 1, 6. The D.C. Circuit had borrowed "litigation management techniquest more commonly
used by trail courts," such as a procedural order governing briefs, to clarify the issues in "one of
the most complex consolidated appeals ever to be dropped on the D.C. Circuit." Id. (referring to
National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 737 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
28. We wish we could speak more often and freely with our colleagues - try out tentative
lines of thought, debate the relevance of analogous hypothetical situations, speculate on
the way a doctrine would more sensibly be organized. But we often lack the time, and
maybe even the collective will, to change the situation.
Edwards, supra note 4, at 420.
29. Under the D.C. Circuit's Civil Appeal Management Plan (CAMP), the Circuit's Chief
Staff Counsel makes a considerable contribution to the management and streamlining of complex
cases. For example, the Chief Staff Counsel obtains information from the parties to determine
when joint briefs should be required, and when lead or liaison counsel should be appointed.
On the responsibilities of staff counsel in other circuits, see Hellman, Central Staff in Appellate Courts:
The Experience of the Ninth Circuit, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 937 (1980) (responsibilities for evaluating cases
and drafting judgments). See also A. PARTRIDGE & A. LIND, A REEVALUATION OF THE CIVIL APPEALS
MANAGEMENT PLAN (1983) (2d Circuit CAMP program). The Second Circuit CAMP features mandatory pre-briefing conferences. Id. at 13-14. These conferences sometimes produce settlement or
withdrawal of the appeal. Id. at 63; see also O'Connor Speech, supra note 16, at I (although effectiveness
of pre-argument conferences to encourage settlement and reduce delay is still uncertain, the experiments underway in some courts "deserve the attention of all those concerned to improve the
appellate process"). Relatively few D.C. Circuit cases are private law contests of the kind up to
now regarded as most amenable to settlement. For that reason, settlement conferences are not yet
an aspect of the D.C. Circuit CAMP.
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We exchange no written statements of position on the merits of a case in
advance of the post-argument conference."' Here, something other than time is
at stake. The concern is that an initial view committed to paper and circulated
before collegial discussion might acquire a permanence it does not deserve."
Retreat, accommodation, and compromise, my colleagues believe, are more
readily achieved when one's starting position is advanced only in conversation.'Our modus operandi gravitates toward the middle." In contrast to district
court judges, no single court of appeals judge can carry the day in any case.
To attract a second vote and establish durable law for the circuit, a judge may
find it necessary to moderate her own position, sometimes to be less bold, other
times to be less clear. Unheralded by a press fond of separating "liberals"
from "conservatives ' ' 1' 4 is the fact that relatively few courts of appeals decisions
generallyt 5 and relatively few District of Columbia Circuit decisions in particular, elicit dissents. From 1983 to 1984, for example, nearly all of our 175
unpublished judgments and memoranda, and ninety-four percent of our 355
published opinions, issued initially without dissent."
III.

PREPARING AND

REPORTING DISPOSITIONS

Responsibility to write decisions is divided among the panelists at the postargument conference. In form, assignments are made by the presiding judge,
the most senior active judge of the three."s In practice, the division is often
30. However, one member of each panel, designated as the screening judge, circulates a
screening memorandum allotting argument times for the parties and, when appropriate, recommending decision of certain cases without oral argument. See D.C. CIR. HANDBOOK, supra note 15,
at 60-61; D.C. CIR. R. 11(d), 12(b).
31.
At the other extreme, at least one state supreme court randomly assigns the opinionwriting task, and does not meet to vote on a case until a draft opinion is completed. See Judge
Argued 'Child Killer' Trial Was Unfair, Wash. Post, Feb. 3, 1985, at 1, col. 5, 16 col. I (Georgia
Supreme Court Justice's draft opinion rejected at conference).
32. It is the policy of the D.C. Circuit that "all cases to be disposed of on the merits are
discussed at a case conference. . . . No argued cases are decided from the bench, nor are cases
that have been submitted without oral argument disposed of solely by an exchange of written
memoranda among the judges." D.C. CIR. HANDBOOK, supra note 15, at 67.
33. See J. HOWARD, supra note 4, at 190-221; cf. Kaufman, The Anatomy of Decisionmaking, 53
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 13 (1984) ("[Mlanifold conceptions of Zeitgeist held by judges guard against
the rise of aberrant perspectives.").
34. But see Ginsburg, Inviting Judicial Activism: A "Liberal" or "Conservative" Technique,, 15 GA
L. REV. 539, 557-58 (1981).
35. According to statistics compiled by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
96 percent of all published opinions rendered by the federal courts of appeals during the 12-month
period ending June 30, 1984 were issued without dissent. Chatman Memorandum, supra note 23.
But see infra note 36.
36. Chatman Memorandum, supra note 23. Figures provided by the Administrative Office do
not include opinions written after judgment on the merits - opinions concerning attorneys' fees.
for example, or statements produced in response to a suggestion for rehearing en bane - unless
the matters that the opinions address are separately briefed. Taking the additional opinions into
account, the D.C. Circuit clerk's office estimates that eighty-six percent of the circuit's published opinions
for the 12-month period ending June 30, 1984 issued without dissent. Id.
37. If the presiding judge votes in dissent, the next most senior active judge has opinion
assignment responsibility.
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made by agreement. We aim for a more or less even allocation, so that each
panel member will carry away from a sitting period a fair share of the writing
workload.
For each case considered at conference we decide together what form the
disposition will take. In the District of Columbia Circuit, decisions come in
five varieties: opinions under the author's name prepared for publication in the
Federal Reporter system; per curiam opinions for Federal Reporter publication;
unadorned judgments telling little more than who won and who lost; speaking
judgments offering a summary accounting for the result - one or more citations
or sentences to explain the decision; and judgments accompanied by a short
(roughly one to six double-spaced pagesl memorandum. Like the unadorned
and speaking judgments, the memorandum opinion is not designed for Federal
Reporter publication. It sets no precedent but does inform the parties, and the
tribunal from which the appeal was taken, in some (but not great) detail, why
we ruled as we did.3 8 Last year the District of Columbia Circuit issued opinions
for Federal Reporter publication in sixty-seven percent of the circuit's decided
cases, and abbreviated dispositions (simple judgment, speaking judgment, or
memorandum) in thirty-three percent.3 9 The corresponding figures for the Eleventh Circuit for 1983-1984 are forty-one percent published opinions, fifty-nine
percent unpublished, abbreviated dispositions. 40 Abbreviated dispositions issue
swiftly; they save time for judges and conserve space in the Federal Reporter
system. The unsettling question, to which I will return, is whether cases resolved

38. Speaking judgments and judgments with memoranda sometimes are not significantly different in explanatory content. A speaking judgment may contain several sentences and citations;
a memorandum may be composed of a single short paragraph. The statistical reports of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts indicate whether a written disposition was published
and whether the authoring judge was named. The boundaries of these categories have been redefined
several times. The designation of dispositions as "opinion/orders" and the provision of a residual
"other" category has further detracted from a uniform system of reporting among the circuits. In
the past, memoranda have apparently been ranked together with opinions, and both unadorned
and speaking judgments treated as "other." See STATISTICAL ANALYSIS & REPORTS Div., ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TRANSMITTAL No. 47, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICIE AND PROCEDURES
at X-20 (July 1, 1982). For that reason, panels seeking to improve their court's statistical standing
may have opted to issue even an explanation containable in a one-page judgment as a memorandum.
The Administrative Office revised its categories again on July 1, 1984 to elicit more information
about the use of abbreviated forms. The number of unadorned judgments will be reported separately,
and all written dispositions stating the court's rationale will be treated alike. See STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

&

REPORTS Div., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TRANSMITTAL

COMPLETING COURT OF APPEALS REPORT FORMS

No. 62,

INSTRUCTIONS FOR

23-24 (July 1, 1984).

Revision of the various circuits' unpublished opinion practices in the interest of achieving
greater uniformity appears overdue. See Note, Unreported Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals,
63 CORNELL L. REv. 128, 146-47 (1977).
39. But see infra note 61. For the 12-month period ending June 30, 1984, of 533 D.C. Circuit
cases terminated after hearing or submission of briefs, 355 decisions were published; about 80
percent of these were signed and 20 percent were per curiam.
40. Of 1596 cases terminated after hearing or submission, published opinions were issued in

652 cases. Approximately 69 percent of these opinions were signed and 31 percent were per curiam.
More than 95 percent of the unpublished dispositions issued per curiam.
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by abbreviated disposition are in fact decided with sufficient care and hard
41
thought.
The presiding judge at a District of Columbia Circuit panel conference
promptly notifies the clerk's office of the form in which each of the day's cases
will be decided and the judge responsible for preparing the decision. The presiding judge may also circulate to each panel member the day of, or the day
after the case conference, a page or paragraph on each case summarizing the
judges' discussion and noting the proposed disposition. The notice sent to the
clerk's office facilitates our internal accounting. Each month we have a meeting
of the full court. High on our meeting agenda is the statement for each judge
of writing assignments still on his or her work table. If too many cases are on
a judge's work-in-progress list too long, that judge will be asked by colleagues
to stop sitting until he or she catches up.42
A.

Preparation of Opinions Destined For Publication

A judge engaged in writing an opinion for the court operates under several
constraints. The record defines and limits the facts and circumstances with which
he may deal. 43 The parties' contentions ordinarily determine the issues to be
addressed. 44 If the panel or the opinion writer spots a potentially dispositive
question not raised by the parties, the judges generally invite supplemental
briefs, thereby affording the litigants a chance to have their say. For example,
we raised on our own initiative last year, as did several other courts of appeals,

41. A study of the use of unpublished abbreviated dispositions, sponsored by the Federal
Judicial Center, indicates the need for further attention to this question by the Judicial Conference
of the United States. Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States
Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform. 48 U. CHI. L. REv.. 573, 631 (1981).
42. See Proceedings of the Forty-Sfcond Annual Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit,
93 F.R.D. 157, 160 (1981) (remarks of Chief Judge Robinson) (one step toward a "term" system
for issuing opinions is the rule that "a judge will not commence his sittings during a new term
- which starts each September so long as he or she retains in preparation three or more
opinions in cases that were assigned more than six months previously.").
43. Compare Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89 YALE
L.J. 1466, 1494-511 (1980) (House Committee report stating that all new coal-burners must install
scrubbers was a costly perversion of statutory language, born of an unholy alliance between environmentalists and Eastern coal producers), with Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 316 n.38
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (because no party contests the regulatory premises set forth in the House report,
court decides only whether level of pollution abatement mandated by EPA is reasonable).
44. See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 370 (1960) ("This argument [raised
by amicus curiae] has never been advanced by petitioners in this case. Accordingly, we have no
reason to pass upon it."). But see Brown v. United States, 742 F.2d 1498, 1510 n.1 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Bork, J., dissenting); Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 510 F.2d
656, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (per curiam) ("[W]e may . . . consider points not raised in the briefs
or in oral argument. Our willingness to do so rests on a balancing of considerations of judicial
orderliness and efficiency against the need for the greatest possible accuracy in judicial decisionmaking." (footnote omitted)); Friendly, supra note 4, at 223, 233-34 (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
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the question whether trials by federal magistrates, on consent, are compatible
45
with article III of the Constitution.
The author of an opinion is of course guided, or restrained, by precedent
- in the federal courts of appeals, always by Supreme Court decisions 46 and
the published decisions of the writer's own circuit. No three-judge panel in 4a7
circuit is at liberty to depart from the published decision of a prior panel;
law of the circuit may be altered only by the court en banc. 48 We are strongly
influenced by decisions of other circuits and do not, without weighty reason,
create a circuit split. In the District of Columbia Circuit, decisions that will
appear in the Federal Reporter, once they are approved by the panel, are
49
circulated to the full court at least a week before the opinion is released. If

45. Fields v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Auth., 743 F.2d 890, 893 & n.8 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (citing cases); see also American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. O'Connor, 747 F.2d 748,
752 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (parties permitted to file supplemental briefs on ripeness of case for review);
Schor v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 740 F.2d 1262, 1268-69 & n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(parties directed at conclusion of oral argument to brief question whether Commodity Futures
Trading Commission could constitutionally entertain common law counterclaims).
46. This constraint does not, however, amount to a gag order:
The judicial hierarchy is not . . . properly modelled on the military hierarchy in which
orders are not only carried out but accepted without any expression of doubt.... Lower
court judges owe the Supreme Court obedience, not unquestioning approval. Without
obedience by lower courts, the law would become chaos. Without reasoned criticism, the
law would become less rational and responsive to difficulties.
Dronenburg v. Zech, 746 F.2d 1579, 1583 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (separate statement of Bork, J.); see
id. at 1581 n.1 (separate statement of Ginsburg, J.) ("[L]ower court judges are not obliged to
cede to the law reviews exclusive responsibility for indicating a need for, and proposing the direction
of, 'further enlightenment from Higher Authority.' ") (quoting United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d
860, 881 (2d Cir. 1981) (Oakes, J., concurring)).
47. If an appellate bench grows too large, however, inconsistency among panels may become
difficult to detect. See Ginsburg, Reflections on the Independence, Good Behavior, and Workload of Federal
Judges, 55 U. CoLo. L. REv. 1, 11 & n.59 (1983); ChiefJudge Godbold Suggests Ways to Improve the
Courts of Appeals, 1983 THIRD BRANCH 1, 2 (July) (former Fifth Circuit had "more than seven
thousand different possible combinations of judges sitting in panels of three," a situation incompatible with "keep[ing] the law consistent").
48. Resolution of conflicts between D.C. Circuit decisions can sometimes be achieved without
argument before the court en banc. When an opinion is circulated to the full court before publication, see infra note 49 and accompanying text, issues involving apparent conflicts between previously decided cases are highlighted for the court's special attention; if no judge objects to the
panel's handling of those issues, the panel declares them settled. See, e.g., Irons v. Diamond, 670
F.2d 265, 268 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
A panel's pronouncements about constitutional theory or judicial philosophy do not constitute
law of the circuit. See Dronenburg v. Zech, 746 F.2d 1579, 1581-82 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (separate
statement of Ginsburg, J.).
49. Accord 3D CR. INT. Op. P. 5 (C)(5); 4TH CIR. INT. Op. P. 36.2; 10TH CIR. INT. OP.
P. Step 7 ("Deciding an Appeal"); FED. CIR. INT. Op. P. 25(b); cf. 5TH CIR. INT. Op. P. 47.5
(opinion is circulated to non-panel members only when it "initiate[s] an express conflict with the
law of another circuit" or "[i]n other special cases"); 11TH Cut. INT. Op. P. 5(B)(2) (only in
"special cases"). Contra 8TH CIR. INT. Op. P. 6(A) ("When at least two members of the hearing
panel approve the proposed opinion or order, and the third judge has prepared a separate opinion
if he desires, the decision is released and judgment is entered."); 9TH CIR. INT. Op. P. 2(I)(2).
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we know that a proposed decision departs from another circuit's precedent, we
flag the conflict at the time of full-court circulation. Any judge of our circuit
can then suggest further consideration."
I emphasized earlier that a circuit judge's inability to order anything alone
moves the judge toward moderation and away from startlingly creative or excessively rigid positions." As Judge Henry J. Friendly once observed, recalling
Cardozo's wisdom, in most appellate cases the governing law is already made
and not genuinely debatable. When a case does invite a decision moving forward
or setting back the development of the law, "the odds heavily favor the little
against the much." ' 52 The prospect of a dissent or separate concurring statement
pointing out an opinion's inaccuracies or inadequacies heightens the author's
incentive to "get it right," or, at least, to keep it tight. Even when an opinion
survives panel inspection and circulation to the full court, it may be exposed,
post-release, to a further in-house review when the losing party petitions for
5 3
rehearing en banc
The check exerted by colleagues keeps a court of appeals judge from veering
far out of line, but it does have its down side. Justice Rehnquist, when he
spoke here in September 1984, told you of a remark attributed to Chief Justice
Hughes:
He said that during the eleven years he served he had always tried to
write his opinions logically and clearly, but if another Justice whose vote
was necessary to make a majority insisted that particular language be
put in 4. . . , in it went, and let the law reviews figure out what it
meant!1

50. Chief Justice Burger has recommended the creation, initially on an experimental basis,
of an intercircuit panel to resolve circuit splits. See, e.g., Burger, Annual Report on theState of the
Judiciary, 69 A.B.A. J. 442, 447 (1983); Burger Again Recommends A New Court, Wash. Post, Feb.
18, 1985, at A3, col. 1. Observers who question the utility of the proposal have noted that courts
of appeals generally do not part company without strong cause, and when they do disagree, the
issues are often sufficiently important to merit consideration by the Supreme Court rather than by
yet another inferior tribunal. See Wald, supra note 18, at 42. For trenchant argument that the
proposed intercircuit tribunal is unsound as a matter of policy, see R. POSNER, supra note 4, at
162-66.
51. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
52. Friendly, supra note 4, at 222-23 (quoting Holmes' familiar comment from his dissent in
Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 223 (1917), that judges legislate "only interstitially;
they are confined from molar to molecular motions").
53. In 1984 the D.C. Circuit rendered 533 decisions and received 244 suggestions for rehearing en banc. See National Classification Comm. v. United States, 765 F.2d 164, 172-73 n.l,
174 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(separate statement of Wald, J.). Rehearing en banc is seldom granted; three
to six cases a year may attract full court attention. Cf. 8TH CIR. INT. Op. P. 6(D) ("If a petition
[for rehearing en banc] is frivolous, the Court may impose a $250 penalty on counsel."). District
of Columbia Circuit Judge Edward A. Tamm once commented that the petitions could operate as
a labor-saving device for dissenters. Await the rehearing request, he counseled; your dissent will be
spelled out sharply there in not more than the allowable 15 pages.
54. Rehnquist Speech, supra note 1, at 5.
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To what extent do colleagues in fact seek alterations in one another's opinions?
Some judges hardly ever do, and are themselves comment-resistant. Others cling
to habits perhaps formed on law review and offer suggestions generously. They
may even genuinely welcome advice in return. Indeed, some judges are more
prone to receive than to offer suggestions. Comments are generally dispatched
by memorandum, but occasionally judges sit down together, or connect by
telephone, to work out mutually acceptable positions and adjust the shape of
a page, paragraph, or phrase. Separate statements, even dissents, may be warded
off in this way.
What part do law clerks play? Justice Brandeis believed Supreme Court
Justices commanded public respect because they "do their own work.'' 55 In his
day, federal courts had fewer cases and federal judges had no more than one
law clerk. Nowadays, most Supreme Court Justices have four law clerks, and
most court of appeals judges have three. 56 We depend on our clerks almost
totally for the heavy research many cases demand.
In addition to preparatory bench memos and research for opinions, how
much actual opinion writing do law clerks do? It depends - on the character
of the case, the habits and work appetite of the judge, and the skill of the
clerk. Under instructions from the judge, many-today, perhaps most-clerks produce first drafts for the judge to revise. Or the judge may prepare a draft for
the law clerk to critique and complete, or the opinion may be divided into sections, the judge drafting certain parts, the clerk other parts. Whatever the division, the judge has a large hand in the process. I know that is so in the District
of Columbia Circuit. I can tell because writing styles in our circuit vary discernibly from one set of chambers to the next. With few exceptions, if I cover over
the name on an opinion, I can nonetheless identify the judge responsible for the
decision. The style, retained through annually changing law clerk guards, is the
strongest clue.
Our complex cases, the pressure of time, and anxiety to show that the
opinion author really did do battle with a formidable record, sometimes combine
to produce oversized decisions hard on the reader's mind and eyes. One does
not have to turn far into any recent Federal Reporter volume to find long,
complicated opinions, filled with abstract, sometimes arid discussions under such
headings as "standard of review," cliches and shibboleths bundled together with
string citations, and imposing stalagmites of footnotes jutting up from the bottom
of each page. The best opinions, I believe, still reflect what Karl Llewellyn
identified as, historically, the pattern of "work in the Grand Style," "simplicity

55. A. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO WARREN 201 (1958).
56. Some have attributed to the increase in the number of law clerks the increase in the
density and length of court decisions, and in the number and bulk of footnote accompaniments
thereto. See R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 102-19, 230-41; Griswold, Cutting the Cloak to Fit the Cloth:
An Approach to Problems in the Federal Courts, 32 CATH. U.L. REv. 787, 799 (1983); Barone, Our
Overworked Justices Should Fire Some Law Clerks, Wash. Post, Nov. 24, 1982, at A17, col. 1; see also
O'Connor Speech, supra note 16, at 2 ("[J]udges themselves could help reduce appellate delay by
striving to keep their opinions as succinct as possible while still addressing the essential issues.").
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of verbal form and of sentence and paragraph structure, in combination with
a certain pungency.

''

7

Some of our published opinions issue per curiam. The per curiam has a
variety of uses. It may be used to emphasize by terse and sharp statement that
we find the merits one-sided. Such an opinion ordinarily consumes little judge
time.58 A time-consuming opinion may also be styled per curiam, however.
The panel may divide the labor on a big case among two or three chambers,
and label the joint product "per curiam. ' ' 9 In addition, we may decide to
issue an opinion per curiam to underscore the panel's unanimity in a specially
sensitive or noteworthy case."°
B.

Use of Abbreviated, Unpublished Decisions

I stated earlier that last year abbreviated dispositions were used to state our
decisions in about one-third of the appeals we adjudicated." How do these
dispositions, our practice of not publishing them, and our rule against citation
of unpublished orders as precedent, 62 measure up against the court's obligation
to reason why? 6 " Before I essay.any answer, a few background considerations
bear attention.

57. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 37 (1960). For recent comment on the
importance of style and structure in judicial opinions, see White, The Judicial Opinion and the Poem.
Ways of Reading, Ways of Life, 82 MicH. L. REV. 1669, 1679 (1984).
58. E.g., Doyle v. United States Dep't of Justice, 668 F.2d 1365 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1002 (1982).
59. E.g., McSurely v. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 525 (1985); National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 737 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (per curiam).
60. See, e.g., Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam); United States
v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (per curiam; en banc) (Pentagon Papers),
aff'd sub nom., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). See also
Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 740 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (third appeal on
merits of long-pending Title VII-Equal Pay Act case involving differential treatment of male and
female cabin attendants), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 939 (1985).

61. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. The proportion of unpublished D.C. Circuit
opinions for the 12-month period ending June 30, 1984 was unusually low. "In the statistical year
1982 (July 1, 1981-June 30, 1982), 51% of [the] court's 627 decisions were unpublished as compared
to 32.8% of [the] court's 533 decisions in statistical year 1984." National Classification Comm.
v. United States, 765 F.2d 164, 172 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (separate statement of Wald, J.).
62. D.C. CIR. R. 8 (f) states:
"Unpublished orders, including explanatory memoranda of this Court, are not to be cited
in briefs or memoranda of counsel as precedents. However, counsel may refer to such
orders and memoranda for such purposes as application of the doctrines of res judicata
[claim preclusion], collateral estoppel [issue preclusion) and law of the case, which turn
on the binding effect of the judgment and not on its quality as precedent."
63. In composing these remarks, I have relied particularly on the excellent study sponsored by
the Federal Judicial Center, Reynolds & Richman, supra note 41 (based on 1978-1979 dispositions),
and on two submissions to the D.C. Circuit concerning the court's use of unpublished dispositions:
a detailed May 1984 report by a subcommittee of the circuit's advisory committee on procedures;
and the June 8, 1984, summary report and recommendations of the full advisory committee. Both
reports are featured in a thoughtful statement by my colleague. Circuit Judge Patricia M. Wald, presented
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First, I should clarify that unpublished does not mean nonpublic. All our
dispositive orders are matters of public record. They are released by the clerk's
office along with siip opinions that will appear in the Federal Reporter, and
are retained in case files open to the public. Copies may be obtained by anyone
on payment of a 50-cent-per-page fee. The court does not index abbreviated
dispositions by subject matter, however 6 4 and has not authorized any out-ofcourt agency to index them. The absence of an index means that, practically,
the dispositions will remain inaccessible to researchers. 65
Second, the unpublished disposition is hardly a new invention. Case reporting, historically, has been a selective enterprise; the decision on what to
publish was once made by private entrepreneurs. 66 Today, West Publishing
Company publishes all opinions circuit courts send to it for that purpose. West
treats district court opinions similarly. A district court opinion will be submitted
for publication if the author decides that other judges and future litigants will
benefit from access to the disposition. Court of appeals dispositions are submitted
in accordance with publication plans effective in each circuit.
The circuit publication plans were stimulated by the Judicial Conference of
the United States and the Federal Judicial Center. In 1964, the Judicial Conference recommended that the lower federal courts "authorize the publication
of only those opinions which are of general precedential value." ' 67 In 1972, the
Federal Judicial Center proposed that each circuit establish a limited publication
plan and forbid citation of unpublished opinions. 6 8 By 1974, each circuit had
devised a selective publication plan to keep from Federal Reporter pages decisions without significant value as precedent and of no general public interest.
list
considerable
diversity. 69 Some
The circuit plans exhibit
70
are
more
impresothers
criteria
for
publication;
specific

in an opinion released June 14, 1985, some months after I delivered this lecture: National Classifica-

tion Committee v. United States, 765 F.2d 164, 173 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (separate statement of Wald,
J.). Judge Wald cautions against overuse of unpublished dispositions. See also R. POSNER, supra note
4, at 120-26.
64.

Such an index might be established and maintained by the clerk's office or library staff.

The Tenth Circuit once kept an index of unpublished opinions, see 10TH CIR. R. 17 (c), but has
recently discontinued the practice.
65. It was rumored that the U.S. Attorney and some of the large law firms in the District
of Columbia indexed and systematically filed the D.C. Circuit's unpublished dispositions. Informal
inquiries, however, have not yielded confirmation of these reports.
66. See Reynolds & Richman, supra note 41, at 575-77.
67.
68.

U.S. JUDICIAL

CONFERENCE,

REPORTS OF PROCEEDINGS

BOARD OF THE FED. JUDICIAL CENTER, RECOMMENDATION

SESSION OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED

11

(1964).

AND REPORT TO THE APRIL

STATES ON THE PUBLICATION

1972

OF COURTS OF

(1972).
69. The Judicial Conference welcomed the diversity; it regarded the circuits as "11 legal
laboratories" engaged in experimentation to accumulate experience. U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE,
REPORTS OF PROCEEDINGS 12 (1974).
70. See 3D CIR. INT. Op. P. 6(A)(1); 4TH CIR. INT. Op. P. 36.3; 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.1; 6TH
APPEALS OPINIONS
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sionistic.7" The original District of Columbia Circuit rule, which the court at
its January 1985 meeting voted to change, was of the latter kind. It provided,
cryptically: "[T]his Court may, while according full consideration of the issues,
dispense with opinions where the issues occasion no need therefor, and confine
its action to such abbreviated disposition as it may deem appropriate.
Our new rule, sparked by a study and recommendations of the lawyers on our
advisory committee, 7 3 lists the standards we will use in deciding whether a
disposition warrants an opinion suitable for Federal Reporter publication. 7 ' Although not expressed by rule, our policy is to issue a published disposition on
any panel member's request. 75 The main consideration affecting publication, in
line with the original Judicial Conference recommendation,76 is the decisionmakers' view of the precedential value of the disposition - does it involve any
new or clarifying statement about the law?
As a final background factor, I note that an abbreviated decision, even one
that states no reasons at all, does not indicate that, in fact, the court has failed
to reason why. As Lord Coke said of the silent judgments issued in his day:
"[Wlise and learned men do before they judge labour to reach to the depth

R. 24(a); 7TH CIR. R. 35(c)(1); 8TH CIR. R. app. (4); 9TH CIR. R. 21(b); 10TH Cut R,
17(b), (d)-(f). See also infra note 74 (proposed D.C. Circuit rule).
71. See, e.g., 1ST CIR. R. app. B ("whether the district courts, future litigants, or we ourselves
would be likely to benefit from the opportunity to read or cite the opinion, having in mind that
only published opinions may be cited"); 2D CiR. R. 0.23 ("cases in which [the] decision is unanimous and each judge of the panel believes that no jurisprudential purpose would be served by a
written opinion"); 3D CIR. INT. OP. P. 5(F) ("whether or not the opinion has precedential or
institutional value"); 11TH CIR. INT., OP. P. 5(B)(3) ("Opinions that the panel believes tohave no
precedential value are not published.").
72. D.C. CIR. R. 13(c).
73. See supra note 63.
74.
An opinion, memorandum, or other statement explaining the basis for the Court's
action in issuing an order or judgment shall be published if it meets one or more of the
following criteria:
(1) with regard to a substantial issue it resolves, it is a case of first impression or
CIR.

the first case to present the issue in this Circuit;
(2) it alters, modifies, or significantly clarifies a rule of law previously announced by
the Court;
(3)
itcalls attention to an existing rule of law that appears to have been generally
overlooked;
(4) it criticizes or questions existing law;
(5) itresolves an apparent conflict in decisions within the Circuit or creates a conflict
with another Circuit;
(6)
itreverses an agency or district court decision, or affirms a decision of the district
court upon grounds different from those set forth in the district court's published opinion;
or
(7) itwarrants publication in light of other factors that give it general public interest.
D.C. CIR. R. 13(b) (proposed). See National Classification Comm. v. United States, 765 F.2d 164,
173 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (separate statement of Wald, J.).
75. Cf. 2D CIR. R. 0.23 (disposition without published opinion only if favored by all members
of panel)
76. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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of all the reasons of the case in question, but in their judgments express not
any."" Even if silent judgments are in fact well considered, the audience for
court decisions is understandably suspicious. A judgment expressing no reasons
presents the appearance of arbitrariness. Our District of Columbia rule promises
a decision with no waiting, time if the parties stipulate that they will forgo an
opinion. 8 In my nearly five years on the court, not a: single litigant has ever
invoked the "prompt decision but no opinion" prescription. The parties to an
appeal, particularly the losers, want to know the reason why.
I believe that abbreviated dispositions are appropriate in the large majority
of cases in which we use them. They enable us to clear with dispatch cases
presenting no novel issue, and no tenable ground for disturbing the decision
from which the appeal has been taken. They hold down the extent to which
we clutter the pages of Federal Reporters with words that simply say again
what has been said repeatedly in decisions already in print. I would, however,
strike one form of abbreviated disposition from the list. I believe a court of
appeals should never release a result without any stated reason. 9 Every appellate
judgment, in my view, should have some adornment.
Admittedly, in many cases the justification for the result pronounced by an
unadorned judgment would be apparent to any lawyer who read the case file.
Suppose, for example, that a district court judgment challenged on appeal plainly
reflects no harmful error and rests securely on findings of fact that are not
clearly erroneous, or that we find abundant evidence for a jury's verdict assailed
by the appellant as insufficiently grounded, or that we find the presence of
substantial record evidence for an administrative agency's order attacked as
lacking the requisite support.81 Why should we bother to state the obvious, thus

77. 3 Co. Rep. v. (J. Thomas ed., London 1826), cited in Reynolds & Richman, supra note
41, at 576-77 n.11.
78. D.C. CIR. R. 13(c).
79. Accord Reynolds & Richman, supra note 41, at 606; see also Note, supra note 38, at 134-35.

As Justice O'Connor recently remarked:
Our efforts to reduce delay at trial and appellate levels must not, of course, lead us
to neglect the quality of decisions that result from the judicial process. Because a written
opinion requires a court to justify its conclusion explicitly, it is an important ingredient
in promoting sound decisions and in preserving public respect for the judiciary. Consequently, we must be wary at the appellate level of widespread use of judgments given
without explanation.
O'Connor Speech, supra note 16, at 2. See also National Classification Comm. v. United States, 765
F.2d 164, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (separate statement of Wald, J.) ("[I]t is imperative that we

scrutinize our selection of those cases to be disposed of without reasons and without precedential
effect ever more carefully so as to avoid confusion, repetition, nonuniformity, and even skepticism
about the way we do our job.").
80. See 5TH CIR. R. 47.6 (authorizing unadorned judgment in these situations, if "the court
also determines that... an opinion would have no precedential value").
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dignifying a meritless appeal? We should explain our result, I believe, if only
to show that we decided the appeal on the merits, and did not exercise a
discretion Congress has thus far withheld from us. 8 Courts of appeals may not
choose their cases. We do not deal in writs of certiorari.8 2 A peremptory judgment without any stated reason bears an uncomfortably close resemblance to
simple rejection of a case as unworthy of review.
The adornment need not be elaborate. If the trial judge's fact findings are
not clearly erroneous, or there is sufficient evidence for the jury's verdict, or
the agency's ruling rests on substantial evidence, we can in many cases say
just that and no more. When the district court or agency furnished an adequate
accounting and we agree with that explanation, we can simply say we decide
on the bases of the opinion below. 8 Sometimes citation to Supreme Court or
circuit court precedent squarely on point is all we need offer.
A limited publication rule, however sensible its purpose, is susceptible of misuse. What controls might a court install to inhibit resort to an unpublished, abbreviated disposition to conceal or avoid a troublesome issue?8 4 One safeguard is
a presumption in favor of publication, a "when in doubt, publish" approach.8 5

81.
See Reynolds & Richman, supra note 41, at 598, 625-26 (Congress has made appellate
jurisdiction of circuit courts mandatory).
82. In his September 15, 19134, address at University of Florida College of Law, Justice
Rehnquist suggested that, in the interest of reducing the delay and expense of civil litigation in
federal courts, "[plerhaps . . . the time has come to abolish appeal as a matter of right from the
district courts to the courts of appeals, and allow such review only when it is granted in the
discretion of a panel of the appellate court." Rehnquist Speech, supra note 1, at 10; see also H.
FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 176-77 (1973); McGowan, The View from an
Inferior Court, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 659, 666-67 (1982) (proposals for discretionary jurisdiction
for courts of appeals in some categories of cases).
83. There is no reason to avoid reliance on the decision of the tribunal of first instance when
that forum said everything that needs to be said. Cf. Marshall, The Federal Appeal, COUNSEL ON
APPEAL 151-52 (A. Charpentier ed, 1968) (criticizing the appellee who neglects a well-developed
lower court opinion in the case on review). We sometimes hedge when referring to the decision
before us for review by saying "affirmed, substantially [or generallyl for the reasons stated by [the
district court or the agency]" (emphasis added). We do so to avoid indicating blanket approval
when the decision is flawed in small ways that do not detract from the result, and pinpointing
minor disagreements strikes us as an unnecessary paper grading endeavor. But see Reynolds &
Richman, supra note 41, at 603-04 (the qualification "substantially" is troublesome "because it
does not indicate which portions of the opinion below are accepted and which are rejected").
84. See NLRB v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers Local 990, 430 F.2d 966, 972 (5th Cir.
1970) (affirmance without opinion should never be used "to avoid making a difficult or troublesome
decision or to conceal divisive or disturbing issues"). The study sponsored by the Federal Judicial
Center indicated that resort to unpublished dispositions to suppress precedent was not a major
problem. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 41, at 609 (less than one percent of nearly 900 dispositions in sample resolved novel questions). But see Comment, A Snake in the Path of the Law. The
Seventh Circuit's Non-Publication Rule, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 309, 338 (1977) ("[Tlhe implementation
of [the Seventh Circuit's non-publication rule] has occasioned loss to the bar and bench.").
85. See Reynolds & Richman, supra note 41, at 590-91, 630. One proposed objective criterion
would require a published opinion whenever the ruling on review is reversed for reasons other
than an intervening change in law or fact, or affirmed on grounds other than those set forth below.
See id. at 609-11, 617-20, 627 & n.168 (defects in law or its administration and mistakes of agencies
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As a further check, a court could circulate abbreviated dispositions among all its
members prior to release. s
By not submitting a decision for Federal Reporter publication, the court
indicates that it regards the decision as establishing nothing new or noteworthy.
I see no sufficient reason, however, why a court should block reproduction of
abbreviated dispositions in specialty reporters or by a computerized legal research system, or even in a collection devoted to judgments of the court not
published in the Federal Reporter. The possibility of unofficial publication, I
note, might serve as an additional control on the fair administration of the
court's publication plan. If abbreviated dispositions were indexed and available
to researchers generally, I would not preclude their citation in parties' briefs.87
The court itself, however, should not cite a decision it has labeled as lacking
general precedential value. A "no citation" rule applicable to the court itself
should discourage parties from referring to abbreviated dispositions when they
caft rely on something better.
The circuits have experimented and gained experience with their diverse
publication plans for over a decade. The time has come, I believe, for central
review of accumulated experience in the interest of establishing a sensible, even88
handed, uniform system for all of the circuits.
IV.

CONCLUSION

To conclude these remarks on the obligation of appellate judges to reason
why, I draw on the memorial tribute one giant of our profession, Learned
Hand, paid to another, Benjamin Cardozo. Hand said of Cardozo:
and judges should not be shoved under the rug). See also supra note 74 (proposed D.C. CIR. R.

13 (b)(6)).
A debatable question is whether a separate concurring statement or even a dissenting view,
in all instances, should trigger publication. In a particular case, there may be two routes to a
result, neither of which is of any general public interest - and one of the three judges may prefer
the alternate route, so stating in a concurrence. A dissent may be based on no more than a different
reading of the facts contained in the record. An automatic publication rule would force a judge
to choose between suppressing his or her genuine view of a case and requiring colleagues to go
through the trouble of publishing an opinion that no member of the panel considers worthy of
publication. But see Reynolds & Richman, supra note 41, at 612-17, 627 (all cases containing separate
opinions should be published). The Ninth Circuit rule leaves it to the author of the concurring
or dissenting statement to decide on publication. 9"TH Cut. R. 21(b)(6). The presence of a separate
opinion is one criterion to be considered under the publication rules of the Fifth and Sixth Circuits.
See 5TH C.

R. 47.5.1; 6i-H Cm. R. 24(a)(1)(iv).

86. Circulation would not be an effective control if the proposed abbreviated disposition lacks
a sufficiently informative presentation of the facts, the prior history of the case, and the relevant
legal authorities. Cf. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 41, at 626-27 (every decision should include
such information).
87. Some judges fear that any permission for publication or citation would lead either to
time-consuming fdling-in, polishing, and editing - thus defeating the principal purpose of limited
publication plans, to achieve swifter justice - or to abandonment of memoranda in favor of bare
or briefly speaking judgments.
88. The Federal Judicial Center, some months after I delivered this lecture, released a valuable
staff paper in subject: D. Stienstra, Unpublished Decisions: Problems of Access and Use in the Courts
of Appeals (Federal Judicial Center 1985).
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He never disguised the difficulties, as lazy judges do who win the game
by sweeping all the chessmen off the table [; he] would often begin by
stating the other side better than its advocate had stated it himself....
[T]he anguish which had preceded the decision was apparent [to those
who knew him;] . . . he wrote his opinion with his very blood. . . . [Blut
he knew that it was a judge's duty ultimately to decide, not to debate .... 89
Those lines were read at my investiture ceremony, in September 1980, by
a preeminent constitutional law scholar, my teacher and friend, Gerald Gunther.
Professor Gunther added his own summation, setting a model I hold in my
mind as I try to come within hailing distance of it: the good judge Professor
Gunther described
is genuinely openminded and detached, . . . heedful of limitations stemming from the judge's own competence and, above all, from the presuppositions of our constitutional scheme; th[at] judge . . . recognizes
that a felt need to act only interstitially does not mean relegation of
judges to a trivial or mechanical role, but rather affords the most responsible room for creative, important judicial contributions."

89
Hand, Mr Justice Cardozo, 52 HARV. L. REv. 361, 362 (1939).
90. Professor Gerald Gunther Speaks at Investiture ofJudge Ruth Ginsburg in Washington, D C , Colum
L. Alumni Observer, Dec. 31, 1980 at 8, col. 1.
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